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Summary 
Following Kosovo’s issuance of a unilateral declaration of independence in 
2008, the UN General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice 
to pronounce itself on the accordance with international law of the declaration 
of independence. The Court’s answer to that request was that the declaration 
of independence was not in violation of international law. When the Court 
rephrased the question posed to it, from accordance with to not in violation 
of international law, I argue that it resorted to the so-called Lotus Principle. 
The Principle entails that the non-prohibition of a certain course of conduct 
is equal to that conduct being permitted. This assumption is based on a 
positivist voluntarist approach to international law, where states are free to 
act as they wish unless they have otherwise agreed.  
What is curious about the International Court of Justice’s application of the 
Lotus Principle in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, is that it was not used in its 
original formulation which promotes states’ freedom to act. In the present 
case it was used to the benefit of a non-state actor (Kosovo), to the detriment 
of a sovereign state (Serbia). This indicates an evolution of the Principle, no 
longer solely applicable to states but also to other entities in international law. 
It is argued that the evolution is a consequence of international law evolving 
from its state-centric tradition and that competing values to state sovereignty, 
such as human rights and self-determination, are becoming more influential.  
Finally, an alternative approach to the international legal system is presented, 
an understanding which is beyond the binary nature of the Lotus Principle 
which recognizes only prohibited or permitted conduct. Had the Court 
disregarded the Lotus Principle in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, it could have 
conducted a fuller review of the legal framework concerning secession, 
discussing whether acts that were not prohibited could have been 
characterized as something other than permitted.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.1 Though 
Kosovo is recognized by 113 states,2 Serbia has since persistently disputed 
Kosovar independence. In January 2017, a train headed from Serbia towards 
Mitrovica in northern Kosovo was painted in Serbian colors with the text 
‘Kosovo is Serbia’. The train was denied entry into Kosovar territory by the 
Kosovar authorities.3  
This situation is just one example of multiple conflicts around the world 
between groups of people and sovereign states. The common nominator is the 
struggle between a group seeking independence from the state it territorially 
belongs to, and the territorial state wanting to affirm its sovereignty.  
Following the Kosovar declaration of independence of 17 February 2008, the 
UN General Assembly referred a request for an advisory opinion to the 
International Court of Justice (hereinafter the ICJ or the Court). The UN 
General Assembly requested the ICJ to clarify whether the declaration of 
independence was in accordance with international law. This thesis will 
assess the Court’s answer to that request through an analysis of the Court’s 
application of the Lotus Principle,4 as well as synthesize academic responses 
                                                 
1
 Kosovar Declaration of Independence, 17 Feb 2008,  
<www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635> accessed 15 May 2017. 
2
 Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘International recognitions of the 
Republic of Kosovo’ <www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224> accessed 12 May 2017. 
3
 BBC, 'Serbia-Kosovo train row escalates to military threat' 15 January 2017 
<www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38630152> accessed 8 May 2017. 
4
 The Lotus Principle – derived from SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 10 (1927) – entails that all which is not prohibited for states is permitted.  
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to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.5 It will also discuss and problematize the 
state-centric focus of the international legal system.  
1.2. Aim and research questions 
The aim of the thesis is to proffer a proposal for an alternative interpretation 
of the Lotus Principle and the way it operated in the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion. The Lotus Principle essentially entails that as long as a certain 
course of conduct is not prohibited for states it is permitted, and it promotes 
a positivist, state-centered and consensualist view of international law. I will 
argue that the Principle has now been detached from its state-centric 
rationale, and has become applicable to also non-state actors. Possible reasons 
for the detachment of the Principle from its rationale, such as an increased 
respect for human rights or the right of self-determination, will be assessed. 
Apart from examining the Lotus Principle’s role in the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion, the thesis also includes a discussion on alternative views of the 
international legal system, as not consisting only of prohibitions or 
permissions, but possibly a wider range of categories.   
In order to reach the aims presented above, the following questions will be 
considered:  
 What led the Court to conclude that the declaration of independence 
of Kosovo was not issued in violation of international law?  
 What role did state-centrism and the Lotus Principle play in the 
Court’s reasoning? 
 What would have been the implications of the Court disregarding the 
Lotus Principle and basing its reasoning on a non-binary 
understanding of international law?  
                                                 
5
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403 (hereinafter Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion). 
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1.3. Definitions 
For the purpose of this thesis, the following meanings of the below concepts 
are implied if not otherwise stated:  
Human rights: The inherent dignity and value of every human being.  
Human rights law: The international legal regime geared towards protecting 
human beings from infringements of their human rights.  
Positivism: The idea of law as consisting only of black-letter law created by 
states or courts, separated from morals and ethics.6  
Self-determination: The right of a group to determine its own form of 
governance.7 
Secession: A type of self-determination entailing the separation of a non-state 
entity from the sovereign state it was previously part of.8   
State-centrism: The focus of international law on state’s interests as well as 
the dependency of international law on the consent of states for its creation 
and function.  
State sovereignty: The power of governance within a certain geographic 
territory.9   
                                                 
6
 Hans J Morgenthau, 'Positivism, functionalism, and international law' (1940) 34 The 
American Journal of International Law 260, p 261. 
7
 Common article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.  
8
 Marcelo G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), p 3. 
9
 Daniel Philpott, ‘Sovereignty’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 
edn), Edward N. Zalta (ed), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/sovereignty/> accessed 22 March 
2017. 
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Voluntarism: The idea that the ‘law is equated with the will of the law-
maker, who decides upon the content and legal character of a norm.’10 
The Lotus principle: A principle of international law entailing that that which 
is not prohibited for states is permitted.11 
1.4. Method and material 
The thesis starts off as a review of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion which leads 
into discussions on the structure and possible evolution of the international 
legal system. 
To provide the background to the issues presented in the thesis, statements 
and resolutions issued by the UN in relation to the situation in Kosovo 
between 1999 and 2008 have been relied upon. 
Answering the first research question has required a detailed analysis of the 
Court’s reasoning in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. The wording of the Court, 
as well as legal scholars’ responses to the Advisory Opinion have been 
considered and synthesized to offer a new interpretation of the motivating 
factors behind the Court’s reasoning.  
The subsequent research question relates to the state-centric tradition behind 
the Lotus Principle. To determine the role of state-centrism and the Lotus 
Principle in the international legal system today, as well as in the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion, classic legal scholarship (by Lauterpacht, Oppenheim, 
Stone etc.) has been chosen as the base of my assessment. To show the 
evolution of international law newer contributions have been relied upon (by 
Marks, Muharremi, Parlett, Simma etc.).    
The final research question is answered through the use of scholarship critical 
of the international legal system’s construction (Arendt, Koskenniemi) as 
                                                 
10
 Ulrich Fastenrath, 'Relative normativity in international law' (1993) 4 European Journal 
of International Law 305, p 324. 
11
 Julius Stone, 'Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community' 
(1959) 35 British Yearbook of International Law 124, p 135. 
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well as my own reasoning around the limitations of the international legal 
system as it is perceived today.  
1.5. Structure 
The thesis consists of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
background to the situation that lead to the issuance of the declaration of 
independence as well as the UN General Assembly’s request for an advisory 
opinion by the ICJ. Chapter 3 focuses on the reasoning of the Court, 
introducing key concepts such as the Lotus Principle and state-centrism. This 
part also assesses contributions of international legal scholars to the 
understanding of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. Chapter 4 challenges the 
Court’s use of the Lotus Principle, both in terms of problematizing the 
Principle in its original formulation and discussing alternatives to it. 
1.6. Delimitations 
The Kosovo Advisory Opinion raises a number of issues of relevance to 
international lawyers, among them the implications of a non-state entity as 
the author of the declaration of independence,12 the possibility of remedial 
secession under international law,13 and the legality of the declaration of 
independence under the framework set in place by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244.14 However, due to limitations in time, this thesis will only 
briefly touch upon these issues and instead focus on the influence of the Lotus 
                                                 
12
 See e.g. Andrea Gattini, '”You Say You’ll Change the Consitution” - The ICJ and Non-
State Entities in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion' in Peter Hilpold (ed), Kosovo and 
International Law: The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2012). 
13
 See e.g. Alain Pellet, 'Kosovo - The Questions Not Asked: Self-Determination, 
Secession, and Recognition' in Marko Milanovic and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and 
Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015). 
14
 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. See e.g. Christian Pippan, 'The 
International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's Declaration of 
Independence: An Exercise in the Art of Silence' (2010) 3 Europäisches Journal für 
Minderheitenfragen 145, pp 156-161. 
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Principle and its underlying rationale state-centrism, on the Advisory 
Opinion.  
 7 
2. Background to the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion 
2.1. Introduction 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis revolves around the 
UN General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion concerning the 
accordance with international law of Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
and the following response from the ICJ. An awareness of the events leading 
up to the UN General Assembly’s request is important in order to understand 
what was at stake for Serbia, Kosovo and the international community. The 
following section provides a brief overview of the events leading up to the 
issuance of the declaration of independence and the subsequent request by the 
UN General Assembly.  
2.2. The issue 
On June 10 1999, Kosovo was placed under UN administration through 
Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council.15 This happened in the wake of 
NATO’s so-called humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.16 The Resolution 
aimed to establish an ‘interim administration for Kosovo’ which would 
‘provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions’.17 The 
aim was for the people of Kosovo to ‘enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.18  
 
                                                 
15
 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. 
16
 The legality of this intervention has been discussed at length by others. See, e.g., Anne 
Orford, 'Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism' 
(1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 679, and Hilary Charlesworth, 
'International Law: A Discipline of Crisis' (2002) The Modern Law Review 377. 
17
 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244, para 10.  
18
 ibid. 
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Hopes were high that Kosovo and Serbia under the UN Security Council set-
up would reach a working agreement on the territorial status of Kosovo.19 
However, the agreement stalled and in 2005 the UN Secretary-General 
appointed Martti Ahtisaari as a Special Envoy for the future status process for 
Kosovo. Ahtisaari oversaw multiple negotiation attempts between Serbia and 
Kosovo, reporting that the parties were unable to agree on most issues.20 On 
March 26 2007, Ahtisaari stated that it was clear to him that the parties would 
not be able to reach an agreement on the future status of Kosovo and that ‘the 
time ha[d] come to resolve Kosovo’s status’.21 He saw independence for 
Kosovo as the only viable option,22 and proposed that a Constitutional 
Commission convene to draft a Constitution for Kosovo.23 Ahtisaari’s 
conclusions and recommendations were supported by the UN Secretary-
General,24 but failed to attract unanimous approval in the Security Council.25 
The members of the Assembly of Kosovo were elected later the same year,26 
and the Assembly’s inaugural session was held in early 2008.27  
                                                 
19
 Cedric Ryngaert, 'The ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: 
A Missed Opportunity?' (2010) 57 Netherlands International Law Review 481, p 482. 
20
 Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (5 June 2006) S/2006/361, (1 September 2006) S/2006/707 and (20 November 
2006) S/2006/906. 
21
 Letter dated 26 March 2007 March from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
president of the Security Council attaching the Report of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status (26 March 2007) UN Doc S/2007/168, para 5. 
22
 ibid, paras 3 and 5.  
23
 Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the president of the 
Security Council attaching the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on 
Kosovo’s future status, Addendum (26 March 2007) UN Doc S/2007/168/Add.1, article 
10(1). 
24
 Letter dated 26 March 2007 March from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
president of the Security Council attaching the Report of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status (26 March 2007) UN Doc S/2007/168. 
25
 See Draft Res sponsored by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and 
the United States (17 July 2007) S/2007/437 Provisional, which was withdrawn 20 July 
2007. 
26 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (3 January 2008) UN Doc S/2007/768. 
27 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (8 March 2008) UN Doc S/2008/211. 
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On February 17 2008, the Assembly and the Prime Minister of Kosovo 
adopted the declaration of independence. Its first paragraph reads as follows: 
We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be 
an independent and sovereign state.
28
   
The declaration was immediately denounced by Serbian president Boris 
Tadić and declared unlawful by the Republic of Serbia.29  
Some months later, Serbia was the sole author behind a draft resolution which 
would later be adopted as Resolution 63/3, requesting the ICJ to declare its 
position on the accordance with international law of the Kosovar declaration 
of independence.30  
2.3. The question asked 
The legal basis of the request for an advisory opinion, as well as the 
competence of the ICJ, is regulated in the UN Charter31 and the ICJ Statute.32 
Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute gives the ICJ the mandate to give advisory 
opinions on ‘any legal question’ posed by a body authorized to do so by the 
UN Charter. The UN Charter’s article 96(a) authorizes the UN General 
Assembly to pose such a request.  
It was on these provisions that Serbia based its suggestion to the UN General 
Assembly for a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. Serbia wanted 
                                                 
28 Kosovar Declaration of Independence, 17 Feb 2008,  
<www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635> accessed 15 May 2017. 
29
 UNSC 5839th meeting (18 February 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5839 Provisional, pp 4-6. 
30
 Draft Res sponsored by Serbia (23 September 2008) UN Doc A/63/L.2, later adopted as 
UNGA Res 63/3 (8 October 2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/3. 
31
 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1645, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 
32
 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted and entered into force 24 October 
1945) USTS 993. 
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the ICJ to respond to ‘whether the unilateral declaration of independence of 
Kosovo [was] in accordance with international law’.33 
In the discussions leading up to the adoption of the draft resolution, Serbia 
stressed the need for a non-violent resolution of the issue and expressed hopes 
of avoiding a ‘deeply problematic precedent’ which the Kosovar declaration 
of independence might set for other groups harboring ‘secessionist 
ambitions’.34 Serbia, joined inter alia by Romania and the Comoros, was 
quite certain of what the response to such an ‘amply clear’ question would be. 
They were expecting the ICJ to affirm their position and condemn the act of 
the Kosovar parliament as breaching the state sovereignty of Serbia.35  
The reactions of other states to Serbia’s proposal were diverse. Some were 
critical of it, stating that the draft resolution was merely an attempt by Serbia 
to stall the inevitable process of Kosovar independence.36 Others stressed the 
inappropriateness of the ICJ pronouncing itself on a question of such a highly 
political nature, and pointed to the vast number of states already having 
recognized Kosovo’s statehood.37 Some states instead affirmed the role of the 
ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN and its responsibility to settle 
legal disputes of international law, as well as the privilege of every state to 
request advisory opinions on issues of importance to them.38  
Despite the diverse reactions, the resolution was adopted by 77 votes to 6, 
with 74 abstentions,39 and the framing of the question to the ICJ was the same 
                                                 
33
 Draft Res sponsored by Serbia (23 September 2008) UN Doc A/63/L.2. 
34
 UNGA 22nd plenary meeting (8 October 2008) UN Doc A/63/PV.22, Statement of the 
Representative of Serbia, p 1.  
35
 ibid, Statements of the Representatives of Serbia, p 2 and Romania and Comoros, pp 9-
10. 
36
 ibid, Statement of the Representative of the United Kingdom, p 2. 
37
 ibid, Statements of the Representatives of Albania, p 4 and the United States, p 5. 
38
 ibid, Statements of the Representatives of Egypt, p 7 and Greece, p 8. 
39
 UN Press Release, ‘Backing Request by Serbia, General Assembly Decides to Seek 
International Court of Justice Ruling on Legality of Kosovo’s Independence’ (8 October 
2008) UN Doc GA/10764. 
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as in Serbia’s draft: was the ‘unilateral declaration of independence of 
Kosovo (…) in accordance with international law’.40 
Despite Serbia’s conviction that the question was ‘amply clear’, Serbia and 
the UN General Assembly have, since the Advisory Opinion, been widely 
criticized in scholarship for the narrowness of the question posed. Theodore 
Christakis offers an example of a differently phrased question Serbia could 
have asked:  
Did international law give the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo the right to issue a unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from 
Serbia? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law 
that would give Kosovo the right to unilateral secession from Serbia?
41  
This phrasing is similar to what the Canadian Federal Government asked the 
Supreme Court of Canada with reference to Quebec’s secession, to which the 
Supreme Court replied that there was no legal right to secede unilaterally from 
a state’s territory.42 Seeing that it was Serbian territory which was at stake, it 
is surprising that the question was not drafted more carefully.   
                                                 
40
 UNGA Res 63/3 (8 October 2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/3. 
41
 Theodore Christakis, 'The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law 
Something to Say about Secession?' (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 73, p 
77. 
42
 Reference by the Governor-General Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the 
Secession of Quebec from Canada [1998] 2 SCR 217, para 111. 
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3. The reasoning of the Court 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 has provided the factual background leading to the request from the 
UN General Assembly, as well as an account of some of the discussions 
preceding it. It should now be clear to the reader that the stakes were high and 
hopes were up, especially for the Kosovar people seeking independence and 
Serbia seeking affirmation of its sovereignty. The following chapter is 
divided into three sub-sections, each dealing with issues which arguably 
impacted on the Court’s reasoning. First, controversies surrounding the 
Court’s interpretation of the question will be presented, and possible 
approaches to it. Second, the Lotus Principle will be introduced, as well as 
the state-centric rationale behind it. Finally, the Lotus Principle’s impact on 
the Court will be discussed. The aim of this Chapter is to provide an overview 
of some of the issues raised in relation to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, and 
in depth present the key considerations behind these issues. This presentation 
will, in turn, provide the background to alternative approaches to these issues, 
presented in chapter 4.   
3.2. The question answered 
3.2.1. Jurisdictional concerns 
Some of the initial concerns addressed by the Court in the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion were of jurisdictional nature. In the drafting of the resolution as well 
as in the Court proceedings, states had voiced concern about the political 
nature of the Kosovar situation. The Court affirmed that the question asked 
was of legal nature since it revolved around the accordance of an action with 
international law.43 The argument that its political nature should be decided 
by domestic law was disregarded since the question referred only to 
                                                 
43
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 25. 
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international law.44 A question having not just legal, but also political, aspects 
could not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to advise on the legal matter, and 
the (possibly political) motives behind the question were not the Court’s 
concern.45  
Even if the jurisdictional conditions are met the Court is not obliged to give 
advisory opinions but may exercise discretion.46 However, unless there are 
compelling reasons against it, the Court generally does not refuse to respond 
to the UN General Assembly’s requests for advisory opinions.47 Some states 
argued that the Court’s answer in the present case would only come to serve 
the interests of the state sponsoring the declaration – Serbia – and not the 
interests of the General Assembly.48 However, the Court concluded that an 
individual state’s motives for posing a question were not relevant ‘to the 
Court’s exercise of its discretion whether or not to respond’, and that it was 
for the General Assembly to determine whether the request for an advisory 
opinion from the Court would be of legal value to the General Assembly and 
useful for ‘the proper performance of its functions.49 Consequently, the Court 
saw no compelling reason to decline answering the question.50 
After the jurisdictional issues were settled, the Court dove into the more 
controversial aspects of the Kosovar situation. In the eyes of some, the state 
sovereignty of Serbia had been breached upon the issuance of the declaration 
of independence and it was up to the Court to affirm its importance.51 Others 
might have been hoping that the time had come for the Court to pronounce 
itself on the legality of secession, through a human rights-lens focusing on 
                                                 
44
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 26. 
45
 ibid, para 27. 
46
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 44.  
47
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 31. 
48
 ibid, para 32.  
49
 ibid, para 34. 
50
 ibid, para 48. 
51
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion proceedings, Written Statement of Spain, para 55; Written 
Statement of Russia, paras 76-78 and p 39, para 3.   
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the Kosovar people.52 This and the following chapters will make clear that 
the Court did not really do either.  
3.2.2. The interpretation of the question 
One of the disputes surrounding the advisory opinion was over the 
discrepancy between the question asked and the question answered. The 
Court started by recalling some previous cases where it had departed from the 
language of the question asked. It referred to cases where the question was 
not ‘adequately formulated’, phrased in a way that did not reflect the legal 
questions really at issue or where it was unclear or vague requiring 
clarification before answer.53 However, the Court determined the present 
question to be sufficiently well-formulated and as being clear, narrow and 
specific enough.54  
The Court quickly made clear that the legal consequences of the declaration 
of independence were not asked for. This would exclude the Court from 
having to comment on Kosovo’s statehood, by arguing that there was a 
distinction between a declaration of independence and secession.55 Instead of 
discussing the legality of secession, the Court instead focused on the act of 
declaring independence as a merely declaratory act, that could be considered 
separately and detached from the declaration’s implications.56 In the view of 
the Court, declaring independence from a state was distinct from seceding 
from it.  
Legal scholars have placed themselves in two separate camps in the 
assessment of the Court’s interpretation of the question posed to it. One group 
criticized the Court’s distinction between declaring independence and 
secession, arguing that this did not reflect the situation which was referred to 
                                                 
52
 Thomas Burri, 'The Kosovo opinion and secession: the sounds of silence and missing 
links' (2010) 11 German Law Journal 881, p 882. 
53
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 50.  
54
 ibid, para 51. 
55
 ibid. 
56
 ibid, para 83. 
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the Court nor how statehood is usually effected. The other placed the 
responsibility for the vaguely framed question on the state behind it – Serbia.  
The criticism of the first group was aimed both at the Court’s interpretation 
of the question, as well as its application of international law on statehood. 
This take is exemplified by the following three scholars, all agreeing that the 
way the Court dealt with the issue of declarations of independence and 
secession was not in line with either the situation at hand or with international 
law on the creation of states.  
Anne Peters pointed to ‘what was really at stake’, namely the separation of 
Kosovo from Serbia’s territory and the ‘formation of an independent, 
sovereign state.’57 Thomas Burri was of the same opinion, calling the Court’s 
reasoning a defiance of ‘common sense’ as, in the present case, the 
declaration of independence was ‘the very act that symbolize[d] secession’.58 
Concerning the creation of states, Robert Muharremi referred to how 
statehood is usually effected and argued that the Court created an artificial 
situation where declaring independence constituted an isolated first step to be 
followed by additional steps to create a new state. This did not reflect how 
statehood is usually effected and especially not the process of the creation of 
the state of Kosovo. Muharremi added that the legal question really at issue 
was whether there existed in international law a prohibition of Kosovo’s 
secession from Serbia.59  
There were, however, some who argued that the Court answered what it was 
asked, and instead Serbia was to blame for how the answer to the question 
turned out. The question should have been framed differently in order to 
clarify certain issues of international law. Christakis pointed out that it was 
understandable that the Court chose to limit itself to answering merely what 
                                                 
57
 Anne Peters, 'Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?' (2011) 24 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 95, p 96. 
58
 Burri, 'The Kosovo opinion and secession: the sounds of silence and missing links', p 
886. 
59
 Robert Muharremi, 'A Note on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo' (2010) 11 German 
Law Journal 867, pp 873-874. 
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it was asked and not immerse into questions of secession and statehood.60 Jure 
Vidmar argued along the same lines, if the issues at hand were secession and 
statehood that should have been reflected in the question.61 However, despite 
blaming Serbia for the shortcomings in the Court’s reasoning, Vidmar and 
Christakis seemed to agree with the above mentioned scholars that the really 
important questions here were, in fact, Kosovo’s secession and possible 
statehood.62  
In conclusion of what scholarly opinion has to say on the matter of the 
interpretation of the question, there seems to be consensus on what the 
important issues were in relation to Kosovo; secession and statehood. 
However, opinion differs on who is to blame for the lack of clarification of 
these issues on behalf of the Court. In my opinion, it is clear that the Court 
carefully avoided certain questions of politically charged nature by claiming 
that it was ‘not ask[ed] about the legal consequences of that declaration.’63 As 
Peters, Burri and Muharremi point out, it should have been clear what the 
legal issue was – the legality of the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. This is 
in line with the reasoning of Serbia in the Court proceedings, when referring 
to the possible breach of state sovereignty as a consequence of finding the 
declaration of independence to be in accordance with international law.64 
When the Court distinguished between declaring independence and 
secession, declaring independence became detached from issues of state 
sovereignty. To me, it seems inconceivable that a declaration of independence 
should not have implications for the sovereignty of the state from which an 
entity seeks to declare independence from. If declaring independence were 
not linked to secession, there would be no sovereignty issue. Perhaps this was 
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also clear to the Court, but the risk of entering the politically charged territory 
of state sovereignty lead it to separate between declaring independence and 
effecting it. Naturally, Serbia could, and perhaps, should, have phrased the 
question differently in order to secure the answer it wanted from the Court, 
or at least an answer discussing the legality of secession. The Court’s 
distinction between declarations of independence and secession did, however, 
not rhyme well with conventional understandings of the principles of state 
sovereignty and the creation of statehood.  
From the above it can be derived that how the Court chose to interpret the 
question from the UN General Assembly has been met with criticism, and 
that scholarship is divided in its disapproval of the Court’s interpretation. The 
following will attempt to explain why the Court responded as it did.  
3.3 The Lotus Principle of 1927 
In order to explain the Court’s reasoning around the question, the Lotus 
Principle must be introduced properly.  
The Lotus Principle is derived from the SS Lotus case, decided in 1927 by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).65 The case concerned the 
events following a collision between a French ship – the SS Lotus, and the 
Boz-Kurt, a Turkish ship. The French officer of the watch onboard the SS 
Lotus was tried and convicted in criminal proceedings in a Turkish court. 
France argued that Turkey did not have jurisdiction to arrest and try the 
French officer and the two states agreed to ask the PCIJ whether international 
law prohibited Turkey from exercising jurisdiction over the French officer.66 
The PCIJ found, equally divided but with the President’s decisive vote, that 
since there was no rule in international law precluding Turkish jurisdiction in 
the matter, Turkey had not violated international law.67  
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Although the case was decided 90 years ago, it is still relevant in discussions 
concerning the content and structure of the international legal system. The 
most commonly cited part of the Lotus decision is the following: 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free (…) Restrictions upon 
the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed (…) Far from laying down 
a general prohibition (…) [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide 
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.
68 
These sentences have been interpreted to imply a presumption of freedom for 
states to act as they wish, as long as there is no rule prohibiting that act, that 
is: what is not prohibited is permitted.69 This presumption is also called a 
residual rule, to be applied in the ‘absence of rules or other principles’.70 An 
unregulated issue, a so-called lacuna or legal gap,71 in the international legal 
system calls for the application of the residual rule – the Lotus Principle. 
Consequently, under the application of the Lotus Principle, an unregulated 
course of conduct is considered to be not prohibited. And a non-prohibition 
is an implied permission. 
One of the rationales informing the Lotus Principle is the idea of the 
completeness of the law. Hersch Lauterpacht argued that completeness is the 
‘positive formulation of the prohibition of non liquet’.72 Non liquet has its 
origin in Roman law, meaning ‘it is not clear’,73 and its prohibition entails 
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that courts should not be able to refuse to give a decision due to the absence 
or vagueness of the law. If a court is prohibited from declining to answer a 
legal question or situation presented to it with reference to the absence or 
vagueness of law, the court is forced to develop the law in order to provide 
an answer or ruling. This makes the legal system complete, according to 
Lauterpacht, since there will not be an instance where a court declares a 
situation ‘lawless’.74 In most domestic legal systems there are rules 
precluding courts from declaring a non liquet,75 and instead the courts must 
find a way to settle the issues before them. It is debated whether there exists 
a prohibition of non liquet in the international legal system. Lauterpacht 
considered, among other things, article 38 of the Statute of the PCIJ from 
192076 (later the Statute of the ICJ77) to be indicative of a prohibition of non 
liquet, since its drafters took care to list general principles of law among the 
sources of international law.78 The application of article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute entails that general principles are to be applied by the Court, meaning 
that areas unregulated in treaties or custom may still be covered by general 
principles of law. The Lotus Principle affirms the idea of the completeness of 
law, since its application will lead to the absence of a rule being considered a 
non-prohibition. The absence or vagueness of a rule thus results in a 
permission to act. Under the Lotus Principle an unregulated issue is not a 
problem since certain conduct being unregulated indicates states’ wish to 
keep that conduct non-prohibited. And non-prohibition, in turn, means 
permission.  
The Lotus Principle has been affirmed by the ICJ in its case-law. In 1986, the 
ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case that the only prohibitive rule applicable to a 
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state is that laid down in rules accepted by that state.79 In the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion something similar was stated in terms of the 
illegality of a certain conduct being dependent on the formulation of a 
prohibition.80 Whether the Court actually applied the Lotus Principle in the 
latter case is debated,81 and will be further elaborated on below in chapter 4.  
Although the Lotus Principle has been readily relied on by the Court, it has 
also been criticized. Though it seems to confirm Lauterpacht’s idea of the 
international legal system as complete, Lauterpacht criticized the credit given 
to the Principle, claiming it was merely pronounced in dicta by the PCIJ in 
the SS Lotus case and therefore should not be given more weight than it 
deserved.82 The content of the Principle has also been discussed. Hugh 
Handeyside conducted a review in 2007 on the prevalence of the Lotus 
Principle in ICJ jurisprudence and implied that what had actually been taken 
to be the Lotus Principle was a formulation of the majority’s opinion in the 
terms of the dissenters. The dissenters’ take on the opinion was that it meant 
that a state may act as it wishes unless there is a rule under international law 
precluding that act.83 Handeyside called the dissenters’ interpretation of the 
majority opinion ‘somewhat exaggerated’ but continued to argue that it had 
been accepted as the ‘accurate expression of the majority position’.84 While 
it might just have been that the Lotus majority did not intend to articulate total 
freedom for states, but instead lifted common aims and co-existence as aims 
of international law.85  
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The Lotus decision has been referred to as a classic example of positivism and 
voluntarism.86 The association of the Lotus Principle with positivism relates 
to the fact that the determination of lawfulness was based only on the absence 
of prohibitions, presupposing a freedom presumption. Kolb described the 
rationale behind the Lotus Principle as the focus of the international legal 
order on the primacy of the state and its needs and the idea of the state’s 
unlimited powers which can only be limited by the state’s own will.87 
International law thus only limits states to the extent that they have agreed, 
voluntarily, to the limitation in the form of a prohibition. 
This presentation of the Lotus Principle has touched upon two of the 
rationales that informed it – first, the focus of the international legal system 
on states and second, the wish to keep the international legal system complete. 
The following will present the idea of the international legal system as state-
centric and how that may have affected the Court’s reasoning in the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion.  
3.4. State-centrism 
A short introduction to the history of international law as a state-centric legal 
system will give a background to the Lotus reasoning as well as the arguments 
of several states, including Serbia, concerning the protection of state 
sovereignty in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion proceedings. Following a brief 
historic overview of state-centric international law, Susan Marks’ three 
different types of criticism of the international legal system as state-centric 
will be presented and later referred to in chapter 4 when discussing alternative 
understandings of the Lotus Principle and the international legal system.  
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3.4.1. Historic overview 
In her 2011 monograph, The Individual in the International Legal System: 
Continuity and Change in International Law,88 Kate Parlett concisely 
presents how international law has been described by thinkers from the early 
17th century until today and how the state developed to an entity of its own, 
detached from its rulers or individual members. The following is a condensed 
version of Parlett’s account. 
In the early 17th century, Hugo Grotius described a law of nations, or jus 
gentium, applicable between the rulers of states and between rulers and 
individuals, as well as between individuals.89 He did not consider states to 
have juridical personality under international law.90 Martti Koskenniemi 
called the law of nations an inter-individual law as opposed to inter-state 
law.91 The legal basis of the law of nations was natural law, following 
medieval scholastic thought of natural law applying in all conceivable 
relations – between individuals as well as rulers.92      
A noteworthy change in the conception of international law came some 150 
years later, in 1758, when Emer de Vattel separated natural law from the law 
of nations.93 Vattel conceived of the state as having personality and a will of 
its own, different from that of its members.94 Therefore, the state could be 
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bound by rules not applicable to the individuals making up the state, rules 
which regulated the states’ rights and obligations. Vattel’s idea of state 
personality had support in writings of Samuel von Pufendorf95 and Thomas 
Hobbes,96 although the two latter linked the state’s personality to its ruler or 
sovereign, while Vattel considered the state to be that sovereign and its 
personality not linked to whoever ruled the state at the time.97 Consequently, 
according to Vattel, it was states who created positive international law, not 
their ruler.98 This idea was consistent with the emergence of treaties listing 
states as their parties.99 Though Vattel considered states to be the principal 
rule-maker, he acknowledged natural law principles to be constantly present, 
and state-made law as constrained by those principles.100  
In the 19th century, Vattel’s conception of the law of nations as state-made 
but constrained by natural law was replaced by ‘an instrumentalist view of 
the law as servant of the will of states.’101 The law applicable between nations 
was created strictly by states, following that the only existent rules were those 
voluntarily agreed to by states. Consequently, natural law was abandoned as 
a source of law by the most influential writers of the time.102 The new state 
focus lead international law to be conceived as applying only to states in their 
relations to other states and not to, or between, individuals. Obligations 
towards individuals could only arise in form of obligations to adapt domestic 
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law to conform with international law.103 Rights and duties were, thus, not 
owed or given to individuals directly under international law.  
In the 20th century, the positivist spirit of the 19th century started to be 
questioned, and it was discussed whether entities other than states could have 
legal personality in the international legal system. Parlett gives the example 
of the League of Nations, whose status was never settled but might have been 
the first non-state entity to be given legal personality.104 This is exemplified 
by Oppenheim’s International Law from 1928 stating that ‘international 
rights and duties can only exist between States, or between the League of 
Nations and States’.105  
In the late 20th century, the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law 
was published.106 It listed states as the primary subjects of international law 
but did not exclude that other entities possessing rights, powers and duties 
under international law may be regarded as subjects possessing international 
personality.107 International wrongs were listed as an example, with reference 
to the Nuremberg trials where individuals were held responsible for crimes 
against the international community.108 It was also recognized that individuals 
could enjoy rights according to international law, but that these rights were 
most often vested in the state where the individual resided, and it was also 
that state which could require other states to fulfill the individual’s right, not 
the individual herself.109 
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This timeline shows the development of international law from being heavily 
influenced by natural law to the abandonment of the same. The correlating 
development has been the primacy of the state and its disassociation from the 
individuals comprising it as well as its current ruler, making way for a state 
with its own legal personality. Linked to this is the notion of state sovereignty, 
highly recurrent in discussions on the international legal system and its 
progression.110 What the historic account shows is that the international legal 
system is changeable. It becomes clear that the international legal system is 
not conceived in the same way as it was conceived when the PCIJ issued the 
Lotus decision in 1927. The primacy of the state has come into question by 
scholars as well as international courts and organizations. Although the focus 
of the international legal system was for centuries the sovereign state, in the 
last 100 years a shift can be noticed. International organizations have gained 
primacy and become influential in the international legal system. The League 
of Nations might have been the first organization to be recognized as an 
influential actor in the international legal system, followed by the UN111 and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross.112 In my opinion this indicates 
a structural shift of the international legal system, and the primacy of states 
might be coming into question. The knowledge of the changeability of 
international law is relevant when criticizing the international legal system as 
being too state-centric, it opens up for alternative interpretations of the aim of 
the system as well as of principles describing its function – such as the Lotus 
Principle.   
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3.4.2. Arguing state-centrism 
The previous section has showed the focus of international law of states. 
Susan Marks has elaborated on three sets of arguments used to criticize the 
international legal system as too state-centric.113 The first criticizes the focus 
of international law on states as the only subjects in the international legal 
system. Second brings into question the great influence of state sovereignty 
in the creation and application of the norms of the international legal system. 
The third questions international law as a whole, arguing that it is flawed and 
unable to change into something better. The second and third type of 
arguments are most relevant for the present thesis topic, in the discussion of 
the state-centric rationale of the Lotus Principle, why they will be briefly 
presented below.     
Marks’ second type of state-centrism is linked to state sovereignty as guiding 
in the making and application of international legal norms.114 Marks 
exemplifies this type of state-centrism with the search of a balance between 
human rights and state sovereignty in, for example, humanitarian intervention 
discourse.115 Marks argues that protection of human rights is being used as an 
excuse to breach the territorial integrity of a sovereign state, when the true 
goal is to assert the intervening state’s sovereign right to use pre-emptive 
force. Human rights are used as a false pretext, while the real issue is in fact 
the pre-emptive protection of the citizens of the own state.116 States thus use 
international law to avail themselves of the use of the ‘supreme expression of 
sovereign power’, which is military force.117   
The content and meaning of state sovereignty are debated. An accepted 
understanding of state sovereignty is requiring ‘supreme authority within a 
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territory’.118 Authority entails a right to command and the right to be obeyed, 
and the rights are derived from a ‘mutually acknowledged source of 
legitimacy’, such as a constitution or natural law.119 The authority must also 
be higher than other authorities of the system, a supreme authority. The 
second part of the definition of sovereignty is territoriality. It is not defined 
by the identity of those affected but merely by geography. Those within a 
certain geographic territory make up the sovereign state. 120   
Marks’ third discussion revolves around the issues of international law today, 
and their origin. She asks whether international law could be used to resolve 
conflicts of legality if only it was adhered to, or, whether the conflicts are 
instead a result of the international legal system. Marks exemplifies this issue 
with discussing the paradox of a ‘system for the constraint of state power 
which is also a product of state power.’121 The way the United States is 
distorting human rights law to legitimize Guantánamo prison is an example 
of that.122  
The historic overview above of the state-centric focus of international law has 
hopefully provided the reader with tools to place the Lotus decision in 
context. The 19th century was marked by positivist ideals and state-focus, and 
this focus permeated the Lotus court. The ideals which prevailed in the Lotus 
decision were those that secured states the freedom to act as they wished, as 
long as there was no agreement on a prohibition. Although the Lotus Principle 
has been criticized, it has arguably achieved a prominent position in 
descriptions of the international legal system as well as in case law. 
According to the accepted reading of the Lotus Principle, a state is free to act 
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as it wishes as long as there is no prohibitive rule,123 and this is the reading 
which will be discussed in relation to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion below.  
3.5. The Lotus Principle and state-centrism 
in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
The above Section has attempted to clarify the implications of state-centrism 
on the international legal system, exemplified by the Lotus Principle. The 
following will relate state-centrism and the Lotus Principle to the Court’s 
reasoning in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.  
As was discussed in chapter 3.2.2., the Court’s interpretation of the question 
posed to it has been the subject of disagreement. Not only did the Court 
choose to answer a narrow reading of the question, distinguishing 
declarations of independence from secession, it also rephrased the question in 
a manner seemingly coinciding with the Lotus Principle. The following 
excerpt from the advisory opinion serves as an illustration: 
[T]he General Assembly has asked whether the declaration of independence was “in 
accordance with” international law. The answer to that question turns on whether 
or not the applicable international law prohibited the declaration of 
independence (…) It follows that the task which the Court is called upon to perform 
is to determine whether or not the declaration of independence was adopted in 
violation of international law.
124  
The Court seemed to reason that in order to determine whether an act was 
permitted under international law it had to be determined whether the given 
course of conduct violated a prohibitive norm of international law. If there 
was no prohibitive norm to be violated, the conduct was permitted, in line 
with the Lotus Principle.  
The Court did not find a prohibitive rule in international law against issuing 
a unilateral declaration of independence and, thus, determined the declaration 
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of independence not to be in violation of international law.125 In my opinion, 
when the Court held the negative answer – the non-violation of international 
law – to be an answer corresponding to the positively framed question – the 
accordance of the declaration of independence with international law – it 
resorted to the Lotus Principle. The Court equated non-violation with 
accordance. Judge Simma, though part of the majority, argued that the Court’s 
re-formulation of the question and application of the Lotus principle indicated 
that the Court adopted a traditional positivist approach to international law as 
essentially consisting of agreed-upon prohibitions on states.126 The 
unregulated areas were, thus, not prohibited and consequently, permitted. 
According to Simma, the Court’s reasoning ‘reflect[ed] an old, tired view of 
international law’ geared towards state-centrism, which would have 
benefitted from a more thorough evaluation of prohibitive and permissive 
rules regarding declarations of independence and secession.127   
However, even though the Court might have adopted ‘an old, tired view of 
international law’ in certain aspects of its reasoning, it can also be argued that 
the finding to the advantage of the Kosovar non-state entity reflects a modern 
understanding of the international legal system, heavily influenced by other 
values than state sovereignty.  
To conclude, on the one hand the Court, in its application of the Lotus 
Principle, divided international law into prohibited and non-prohibited acts. 
This reflects the positivist voluntarist approach to the international legal 
system, as developed in the 18th century, consisting only of state-constructed 
prohibitions. On the other hand, the Court found for the people that made up 
the (then) non-state Kosovar entity, a finding which, must have been clear to 
the Court, could infringe on Serbia’s territory and sovereignty. This does not 
reflect the strictly state-centric international law as described by scholars. 
Instead, it indicates that values other than state sovereignty were guiding the 
Court’s reasoning in this situation. The discrepancy between the Court’s 
                                                 
125
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 84. 
126
 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Simma, paras 2-3. 
127
 ibid. 
 30 
method of reasoning around the question posed to it (the application of the 
Lotus Principle) and the finding of the unilateral declaration not being in 
violation of international law (to the detriment of a sovereign state) will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
 31 
4. Alternative reasoning 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have presented some of the issues raised by the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion, with focus on the state-centric structure of international 
law and the application of the Lotus Principle. This chapter will further 
problematize these issues, and offer alternative interpretations of the aim of 
the international legal system as well as question the binary understanding of 
international law as embodied in the Lotus Principle. It will be argued that 
international law is evolving from its state-centric focus and that this 
influenced the Court in its reasoning in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion and its 
application of the Lotus Principle.  
Chapter 4.2. will interpret the Lotus Principle in light of modern day 
arguments against state-centrism and conclude that the manner in which the 
Court applied the Lotus Principle in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is an 
example of the evolution of the Lotus Principle as well as international law. 
It will be argued that the Court did apply the Lotus Principle, but a version of 
the Principle which had become detached from the state-centric rationale that 
informed it. Alternative rationales will be introduced in the form of self-
determination or human rights. 
Chapter 4.3. will discuss the Court’s state-centric tendencies in its binary 
approach to the international legal system as consisting only of prohibited or 
permitted acts, and discuss an alternative understanding of international law 
as consisting of a range of acts.  
4.2. The Lotus Principle post-state-
centrism 
A majority of scholars agreed on the Court’s turn to the Lotus Principle in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion. As established above, the accepted reading of the 
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Lotus Principle is the assertion of states’ freedom to act as long as there is no 
prohibitive rule.128 This is in line with the state-centric international legal 
tradition as well as the principle of state sovereignty which entails that ‘a state 
cannot be legally bound without its consent.’129 However, there are also 
scholars arguing that the Court did in fact not apply the Lotus Principle in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion.130 The Lotus Principle was formulated by the PCIJ 
during a time when the state was considered to be the only actor in the 
international legal system why the system was created and applied to uphold 
the state’s primacy. Christakis pointed out that the Lotus Principle always 
protects state sovereignty why the Court could not have applied it in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, since its application there would have been to the 
detriment of a sovereign state.131 The Principle is only to be used in inter-
state relations, and impossibly in favor of a non-state actor. Alternatively, had 
the Court in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion been true to the original 
formulation and meaning of the Lotus Principle, it would have had to consider 
both the fact that the Principle permitted states to act as they wished unless 
there existed an express prohibition, as well as the state-centric context the 
Principle was originally presented in. Agreeing with Christakis, I consider 
the Court’s application of the Lotus Principle not to be in line with the original 
Principle formulated by the PCIJ in 1927. However, as opposed to Christakis, 
I do think the Principle was applied by the Court, just not in its original 
meaning.  
What is curious about the Court’s application of the Lotus Principle, is that 
the Principle had previously been interpreted as promoting states’ freedom to 
act as long as they were not prohibited from doing so. But the actor behind 
the declaration of independence in the case of Kosovo was not yet a state. 
Despite that, the Court seemingly applied the Lotus Principle when 
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determining the accordance of the declaration of independence with 
international law in that it searched for a prohibition to determine the 
prevalence of a permission. This seems to suggest an extended interpretation 
of the Lotus Principle, applying also to non-state entities. Muharremi argued 
that the Lotus Principle might have been extended, applying not only to states 
but also to ‘states in statu nascendi’, and that this application would be based 
in the exercise of peoples’ right to self-determination or in the principle of 
effectiveness.132 This argument can be positioned in Susan Marks’ second 
type of arguments, linked to the criticism of the prominent position of state 
sovereignty in the international legal system. Muharremi seems to suggest 
that state sovereignty must be weighed against peoples’ right to self-
determination, and that the value of state sovereignty might have to give way 
to other values, namely the self-determination of peoples. To try and position 
self-determination into the matrix of the Lotus Principle would mean 
replacing the rationale behind it. If state-centrism was previously the driving 
force of the Lotus Principle, a new version of it might take into account self-
determination or other values as well or instead.  
Muharremi’s suggestion is one way of explaining the Court’s pro-non-state 
entity application of the Lotus Principle. Alex Mills also argued that the Court 
took a step away from state-centrism in the mere allowance of the question to 
be discussed in an advisory opinion. The question did not concern the act of 
a state or the statehood of Kosovo, ‘but only the (…) actions of a group of 
individuals entirely within a single territory’.133 That it was an issue 
considered to be of relevance to the Court can be an indication of the Court’s 
view of the international legal system as less state-centric than before.  
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The following will assess a possible evolution of the Lotus Principle away 
from its state-centric rationale, starting with the Principle’s formulation in the 
Lotus decision from 1927.  
International law governs relations between independent States.134  
This is clearly still an accurate statement of the function of the international 
legal system. However, it is arguably not the only function of the international 
legal system. As presented above in the historic overview, international law 
has since the Lotus decision in the early 20th century evolved. States are no 
longer considered to be the only subjects of international law. Thus, it must 
follow that international law governs not only relations between independent 
states. Human rights law has placed upon states duties owed to individuals 
within the territory of the state. Individuals can come under international 
criminal liability in international criminal law. The ambit of international law 
has come to encompass more than the regulation of state conduct in relation 
to other states.  
Apart from pronouncing itself on the function of the international legal 
system, the PCIJ in the Lotus decision continued to assert the voluntary nature 
of regulations of state conduct, as well as a presumption against prohibitions:  
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will. 
(…) Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed 
(…) Far from laying down a general prohibition (…) [international law] leaves 
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain 
cases by prohibitive rules.
135
 
This excerpt from the Lotus decision makes quite clear that the PCIJ’s 
motives behind it were geared towards the protection of states and their 
freedom to act. Again, placing the Lotus decision in context takes us back to 
the peak of a state-centric era with state sovereignty as the means and end of 
the international legal system. States were detached from the individuals 
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comprising or ruling them, in a Vattelian manner, with legal personality of 
their own. However, when considering the Court’s application of the Lotus 
Principle in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 80 years after the Lotus decision, 
there seems to have been a shift from the state-centric, state-protective 
rationale.  
The following will discuss what values, if not state-centrism, might have 
guided the Court in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. As Muharremi suggested, 
briefly presented above, self-determination and the principle of effectiveness 
prevailed over state sovereignty in the Court’s application of the Lotus 
Principle. This could be a correct interpretation of the Court’s reasoning, 
however it is not what the Court expressly purported to do. In fact, the Court 
clearly stated that the issue before it, the issuance of a declaration of 
independence, was not necessarily linked to the exercise of a right (such as 
self-determination).136 So, according to the Court, self-determination, or any 
right derived from it, was not relevant in the present case. But still, the Lotus 
Principle was applied in favor of a non-state entity to the detriment of a 
sovereign state. It should be noted that this statement presupposes that a 
state’s primary concern and goal is to maintain its stability and sovereign 
territory. It could, however, also be argued that the primary goal of a state 
should be the welfare of its inhabitants, and if a group is not treated well (such 
as the Kosovar people), the state should do everything in its power to make 
sure that the group of people are treated fairly, even if it means giving up part 
of its territory. However, this has not been the prevailing understanding of 
statehood and its goals. Instead, the preservation of power and territory have 
been the primary concerns of states since the birth of the nation state. Perhaps 
international law came to govern primarily the relation between states 
precisely for this reason, to stabilize the fight for power and territory. There 
are scholars arguing, among them Muharremi, that international law is, or 
could be, much more than just state-made state-constraint. Howse and Teitel 
argue along the lines of Marks’ first and second critiques of state-centrism in 
international law, highlighting the importance of individuals, as well as 
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peoples, as autonomous actors in the international legal system.137 Self-
determination, the right of a group not comprising a state, could be an 
alternative value to state sovereignty in the application of the Lotus Principle.  
The right of peoples to self-determination developed into a legal norm in the 
1960s and 70s. European colonial rule had lost its legitimacy and 
independence was granted to post-colonies.138 Self-determination has various 
different aspects and most relevant for this thesis is its link to secession. 
Secession is one form of self-determination.139 The international legal 
community, however, took care to limit secession to situations of 
decolonization.140 It was later questioned why comparable situations were 
treated differently depending on the source of oppression – a foreign ruler 
(such as the European colonizers) or a ruler within the state (as in 
Yugoslavia).141 Still today, there is wide opposition against secession,142 and 
when a state in certain instances recognizes statehood in in a seceding entity 
it is often referred to as a sui generis case, meaning that the circumstances in 
the specific situation warrant recognition, but that they do not set a precedent 
for future claims of independence.143   
Self-determination could be used as an alternative rationale to state 
sovereignty in instances of application of the Lotus Principle. Self-
determination has been used before to limit state sovereignty (for example in 
the decolonization processes of the 60s and 70s) and it challenges the state-
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centric focus of international law. However, claiming self-determination as a 
basis for secession also feeds into the state-centric understanding of the 
international legal order. The whole concept of statehood does. Self-
determination related to statehood revolves around granting a group of people 
in a territory the right to be considered a sovereign state. And in a state-centric 
legal order, that is the ultimate achievement. The issue of self-determination 
being used against the legal system that it is essentially a part of falls within 
Marks’ third type of criticism of state-centrism. She describes the paradox of 
using the legal system to constrain state power, when state power is a result 
of that same legal system. Using self-determination – a product of the legal 
system – to replace state sovereignty risks feeding into the already state-
centered legal system. It might help develop international law into a less state-
centric system, but it will hardly revolutionize it.  
Another alternative rationale to state sovereignty is human rights. Hannah 
Arendt noted a shift in the conception of law with the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen from 1789,144 placing man as the source 
of law instead of God or tradition.145 To be noted is the basis of human rights 
in human beings, without the involvement of an authority to assure them.146 
The missing link to an authority is important when discussing human rights 
as a possible alternative to state sovereignty, the authority being, for example, 
a state. On the one hand, the fact that human rights evolved without being 
dependent on state involvement speaks for it being a strong contender to state 
sovereignty as a guiding value behind the Lotus Principle. On the other hand, 
however, instead of human rights staying away from state-centric 
international law, it adapted to it. States are now the prime guarantors of 
human rights. Human rights may be ‘natural, unalienable, and sacred’147 but 
they are still only enjoyed by persons with a sufficiently strong connection to 
a state. Arendt identified ‘a right to have rights’, which is strongly linked to 
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belonging to a community which can ensure rights protection.148 Once an 
individual loses the tie to that community, as the Jews in Nazi-Germany, she 
is suddenly deprived of what we know as human rights. Her inherent dignity 
is not enough to secure her right to life. Perhaps human rights could have 
developed in a different direction, and really been inalienable and inherent in 
every human being. But in a state-centric international legal system it is 
difficult to grasp what an international human rights regime would look like 
without the state-connection. Even though the French considered the human 
to be the basis of law, the way the international legal system functions the 
states are the main duty and rights-bearers.  
Returning to the Lotus Principle, despite human rights enforcement’s strong 
link to the state, I believe it can be used to tip the scale against state 
sovereignty in certain situations. Secession could be legal in situations of 
grave human rights violations, as argued by for example Marc Weller.149 In 
such a situation human rights would weigh heavier than state sovereignty, for 
example leaving a court to declare secession non-prohibited in certain 
situations. However, as with self-determination, which in some instances – 
for example secession – is inherently linked to statehood, human rights has 
also become part of the state-centric international legal system. It is hard to 
challenge a system (international law) with the tools provided by that same 
system (human rights).   
Giving alternatives to state-centric international law is not difficult. Howse 
and Teitel stress the normative effect of international law, not just through 
hard law but also soft law and guidelines which aim to direct the conduct of 
states in certain directions, many times away from sovereignty values and 
instead towards principles of human rights.150 Muharremi cites jus cogens 
norms as indicative of a less state-centric legal system, which states are bound 
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by without having consented to.151 He refers to shifts in the structure of the 
international legal system, giving the example of self-determination which is 
built up on entitlements and rights, as opposed to the traditional positivist 
approach which requires a correlating prohibition.152 However, these 
arguments are difficult to link to the Court’s reasoning in Kosovo. Though it 
seems that self-determination was in fact a value considered by the Court and 
weighed against the sovereignty of Serbia, the Court claims that this was not 
the case. According to the Court, the question concerned the prevalence of a 
prohibition on the issuance of unilateral declarations of independence, and 
not the finding of any right to issue such a declaration. It is imaginable that 
human rights could have played a role in the Court’s reasoning around the 
situation, as the issue was raised by multiple states as a reason for secession 
both in the proceedings and in relation to the recognition of Kosovar 
statehood following the Advisory Opinion.153 However, human rights 
violations as a basis for the non-prohibition on declarations of independence 
are not mentioned in the Advisory Opinion, so trying to link the Court’s 
reasoning to that is also fruitless. 
The Court chose to focus on finding a prohibition against unilateral 
declarations of independence. It could have focused on finding a permission, 
in the form of a right, instead, or taken the position that the non-existence of 
either a prohibition or a permission did not necessarily mean the opposite. 
The search for a permission, instead of a prohibition, could have lead the 
Court to discuss the Kosovar peoples’ right to self-determination and 
secession. It is possible that the Court, constrained by state-centric legal 
tradition, did not want to approach an issue that could have led it having to 
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take a stand against state sovereignty, for example stating that secession could 
be legal in instances of grave human rights violations on part of the state from 
which an entity seeks to secede. Instead, the Court chose to focus only on 
declarations of independence as something distinct from effecting 
independence. 
In my opinion, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is a good example of how the 
international legal system is experiencing a structural shift. The positivist 
legal tradition revolving around states’ freedom has become gradually limited 
by demands for a more encompassing legal system. From international 
organizations becoming important actors in the field of international law (the 
League of Nations, UN, ICRC), also individuals have been considered 
subjects of international law – subjects in the sense of entities with the 
capabilities to have rights and duties under international law. When 
subjectivity is extended, the creation and applicability of law must follow. 
Demands from individuals and groups of individuals, such as in the case of 
the declaration of independence of Kosovo, must be factored in. In the 
Kosovo situation, state sovereignty met a demand for independence. And 
instead of limiting itself to the state-centric legal tradition – reflected in the 
original meaning of the Lotus Principle which would have meant affirming 
state sovereignty – the Court developed the Lotus Principle to encompass the 
act of a non-state entity.  
To conclude, even though the Court arguably pronounced itself against the 
sovereignty of Serbia, it is unclear what brought it to do so. As I argue above, 
the findings of the Court indicated a move from state-centrism, however, it 
was a small one. The Court could have taken the chance to declare its position 
on secession by holding, for example, that secession could be legal following 
grave human rights violations, as suggested by Weller.154 That would have 
tipped the scale in favor of self-determination over state sovereignty in the 
present case. In my opinion, the Court could have discussed self-
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determination and secession and not merely the non-existence of a prohibition 
on declarations of independence. The Court did show tendencies towards 
moving beyond the state-centric tradition of international law in its 
progressive application of the Lotus Principle, however, it could have been 
even more progressive in a discussion on possible rights related to 
declarations of independence. But that would have meant answering a 
different question than the one it was asked.  
4.3. Non-binary international law 
In the previous section, alternative interpretations of the Lotus Principle were 
presented, not limited to promoting state freedom but considering other 
values such as self-determination and human rights. The present section will 
instead question the Lotus Principle as affirming the binary nature of 
international law and argue that there could be other legal classifications of 
acts that transcend the categories of permitted and prohibited.  
Judge Simma, though part of the majority in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 
stated in his declaration that the Court failed to take into account the evolution 
of international law when it applied the Lotus Principle and divided 
international law into prohibited and permitted acts. He questioned the 
reliance on the binary understanding of international law, stating that the 
Court in that way excluded a discussion on ‘possible degrees of non-
prohibition’.155 Instead, the Court approached the question ‘in a manner 
redolent of nineteenth-century positivism, with its excessively deferential 
approach to State consent.’156 Simma argued that international law perhaps 
may not only consist of prohibited and non-prohibited acts, but instead there 
might be a range of categorizations.157  
As was presented in the historic overview of international law as a state-
centric system, the international legal system is built around states. This has 
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influenced the development and application of international law. The residual 
rule – the Lotus Principle – traditionally made sure that all non-regulation 
worked in favor of the state, since non-regulations or non-prohibitions 
implied a permission for the state to act as it wished. If states had wanted 
otherwise, that action would have been expressly prohibited by the states. The 
Court in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, though finding for a non-state entity, 
thus upheld the state-centric focus of the international legal system when 
dividing international law into prohibited and permitted acts since that feeds 
into the freedom presumption for states. An alternative approach, as raised by 
Simma and others,158 would not limit international law to a binary positivist 
system, but instead be open to a variety of classifications. 
This approach to international law should not be completely foreign to the 
Court. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion from 1996, the Court had 
to answer whether ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons [could] in any 
circumstance [be] permitted under international law’.159 The Court found that 
there was no ‘specific prohibition’ against the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons neither in custom nor in conventional international law.160 A lack of 
prohibition would, under an application of the Lotus Principle, have meant 
that the specific conduct was permitted, since an unregulated or non-
prohibited course of conduct implies a permission for states to act. However, 
the Court still went on to declare that the use of such weapons ‘would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict’.161 In spite of that, the final conclusion of the Court was that it could 
not conclude definitely on ‘the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its 
very survival would be at stake.’162 The reasoning of the Court did seem to 
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depart from the Lotus Principle in that the Court appeared to prefer not 
limiting itself to prohibitions and permissions. Instead, it presented a 
conditioned permission, dependent on the survival of the state. This could be 
viewed as a departure from the Lotus Principle, as is the opinion of, for 
example, Valentin Jeutner.163 Jeutner argues that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons could have been both illegal and legal at the same time, leading to a 
conflict of norms he calls a legal dilemma.164 
Koskenniemi exemplifies another aspect of the binary structure of 
international law and its state-centric focus with what he calls the ‘battle’ of 
the ‘legal mind’.165 He argues that the international lawyer is constantly trying 
to affirm the independence of international law from international politics by 
ensuring on the one hand the normativity of the law, and on the other hand its 
concreteness. The normative aspect is derived from a natural morality which 
distances itself from the will and interest of the state. Concreteness, on the 
other hand, refers to the rules which correspond to state behavior and are 
linear to state will.166 In order to be taken seriously, international law must be 
both normative and concrete, according to Koskenniemi. Merely 
concreteness, without normative aspects, transforms law into politics, 
completely lacking normative aspirations. Normativity without concreteness, 
however, will result in toothlessness and a lack of justification.167 
International law oscillates between the two, there is no formula providing 
the perfect blend. The binary understanding of international law speaks 
against the existence of such a formula since it does not compromise. It will 
have one or the other.  
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Lauterpacht, as mentioned above, argued for the completeness of the 
international legal system.168 There were no gaps in the international legal 
system since a gap (a non-regulation) would correspond to a non-prohibition, 
which in turn signaled a permission. The alternative to completeness would 
be incompleteness, where a gap in the form of an unregulated issue would not 
need to be filled by a correlating permission. Instead, a gap could signal a 
deliberate silence by states on a certain matter.169  
To question the binary understanding of the international legal system is to 
challenge that a non-regulation, a gap, needs to be filled by a correlating 
permission. The Lotus Principle will fill any gaps: a non-regulation, in other 
words a non-prohibition, implies a permission. An alternative approach 
would be that a gap in the legal system might be intended or voluntary, and 
that it can be resolved in an alternative fashion. Simma suggests the existence 
of a ‘concept of toleration’; a degree of non-prohibition.170 Instead of 
declaring all which is not prohibited permitted, an unregulated act could come 
in different shapes. A tolerated act would be one, a neutral act perhaps 
another.171 A multiplicity of categories would thus disrupt the link between 
non-prohibition and permission. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 
instead of the Court finding both a prohibition and a permission – leading to 
a legal dilemma – it could have found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
was neither prohibited, nor permitted, but something in between.  
The Lotus Principle has been used to assess the legality or illegality of an act. 
It simplifies the process of identifying the legality of an act. An unregulated 
or non-prohibited act is by default permitted with the process ending there, as 
in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. If, however, a non-prohibition would not 
automatically entail a permission, the process would require a further 
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evaluation of the degree of non-prohibition of an act. There could be degrees 
of non-prohibition and perhaps degrees of permission, with each 
categorization requiring individual assessment. This links to Koskenniemi’s 
account of the oscillation of international law between normativity and 
concreteness and the struggle of finding the perfect formula. Toleration and 
other classes of acts could provide at least a conceptual tool to transcend the 
binary nature of international law’s struggle between normativity and 
concreteness.  
In my opinion, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion contained an element of struggle 
between two opposing values, state sovereignty on the one hand and self-
determination or secession on the other, which the Court did not address. The 
Court could avoid that struggle by detaching the act of declaring 
independence from effecting secession. In this way, the Court did not have to 
discuss possible effects on the sovereignty of Serbia, even though an 
infringement on Serbia’s sovereignty was the logical consequence of the 
declaration of independence not being prohibited. If the Court had not made 
the distinction between declaring independence and effecting secession, it 
would have had to discuss the rights attached to secession, as well as the 
impact of the enjoyment of those rights on state sovereignty. That, again, 
collides with the binary nature of international law. Under the prevailing 
binary understanding of international law there would have been no leeway 
to weigh human rights against state sovereignty in an attempt to declare 
secession in the present situation legal. A possible limitation of state 
sovereignty due to human rights abuse or the enjoyment of rights derived 
from self-determination would lead to having to find a middle way, or stabile 
ground, between the opposing values, and would detach from the Lotus-
binary.  
Alternatively, had the Court found the declaration of independence to be 
prohibited under international law, toleration could have been used to soften 
the effects of the prohibited act. Perhaps the act was prohibited, but tolerated 
by the international community. As mentioned above, had the Court linked 
the declaration of independence to secession it might have found that 
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secession was prohibited, just like Serbia was hoping for when phrasing the 
question to the Court. Instead, the Court distinguished between declaring 
independence and effecting it (in form of secession) which lead to the 
prohibited act – secession – not being commented on. Though the Court did 
not expressly legitimate Kosovar secession from Serbia, the Advisory Opinion 
had a legitimizing effect on that act as well. Despite international law being 
unclear on the legality of secession apart from instances of decolonization, 
113 states have recognized the independence of Kosovo from Serbia.172 This 
indicates that secession might have been prohibited, but that it was still 
tolerated in this instance. Muharremi links recognition of statehood in cases 
of prohibited secession to the principle of effectiveness – whether a state has 
succeeded in reaching statehood in the eyes of the international 
community.173 The mitigating factor could also be the level of human rights 
abuse which elevate the prohibited act – secession – to a tolerated act.  
Perhaps the legal system must not revolve around twos; permission or 
prohibition, normativity or concreteness, completeness or incompleteness. It 
can be more fluent and open to adaptation. But this could also involve a risk. 
Koskenniemi’s concern is that international law loses its legitimacy if it 
adapts too much to the will and interest of states, it becomes too linear to 
international politics. But the link to states is also what makes the state-
dependent international law of today concrete. The introduction of middle 
ways and ranges of classes of acts might risk the foreseeability provided by 
states and the established mode of creation and function of the international 
legal system. In my opinion, introducing various classes of acts lessens 
foreseeability in that the assessment of an act will always be dependent on the 
specific circumstances, as it is in every case, but the outcome will not be 
limited to two – legal or illegal. Instead there might be a multitude of possible 
outcomes. The legality of an act would be difficult to assess beforehand.   
                                                 
172
 Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘International Recognitions of the 
Republic of Kosovo’ <www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224> accessed 9 May 2017. 
173
 Muharremi, 'A Note on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo', p 880. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has attempted to decipher some of the ideas underlying the 
reasoning of the Court in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, and offer alternative 
approaches to some of the tasks the Court was faced with.  
In chapter 3 it was argued that the Court’s answer to the request by the UN 
General Assembly was informed by the Lotus Principle, in that the Court 
equated a non-prohibition with a permission. However, the reasoning of the 
Court reflected an evolved approach to the Lotus Principle, in that it was not 
used in favor of state sovereignty, but instead it lead to the promotion of 
Kosovar independence from Serbia.  
The new approach to the Lotus Principle was further discussed in chapter 4, 
where I claim that the Court’s reasoning might have been informed by the 
development of the international legal system into a less state-centric system, 
where individuals and organizations are gaining prominence. Along with 
individuals becoming actors in the international legal field, calls for human 
rights and self-determination are increasingly adhered to. Though not stated 
so by the Court, I believe these were the values behind the Court’s application 
of the Lotus Principle to the detriment of a sovereign state.  
In the final section of chapter 4, it was argued that the view of the international 
legal system as binary – consisting of only prohibitions or permissions – is 
outdated. There may be ranges of classifications of acts which disrupt the 
Lotus-link between non-prohibitions and permissions. The idea of 
international law containing degrees of prohibitions or permissions could 
shift the focus of international law from the will of states to a more-
encompassing system, where rules have an increasingly normative effect on 
the acts of states and others. This could have been the outcome of the Court 
linking the declaration of independence to the act of secession, instead of 
detaching the two, leading to a discussion on the status of secession in 
international law.  
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